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A one-year trial randomized 781 patients with primary insomnia to take suvorexant or a placebo. 3 Patients over 65 years took 30 mg and other patients took 40 mg. After a year, the 322 patients still taking suvorexant either continued it or were switched to placebo. All the patients kept a diary about their sleep. At the start of the study, the patients in the placebo group sa> When efficacy was assessed over a month the suvorexant group was getting to sleep 18 minutes sooner on average and sleeping for 39 minutes longer than before. These benefits were maintained for the patients who continued treatment for one year. There were no statistically significant differences in symptoms when suvorexant was withdrawn, but the time to sleep onset increased and the total sleep time decreased. 3

During the one-year trial approximately 38% of the suvorexant and placebo groups did not complete the study. Adverse events caused 11.7% of the patients taking suvorexant and 8.5% of the placebo group to discontinue. Somnolence affected 13.2% of the patients taking suvorexant but only 2.7% of the placebo group. Other adverse effects which were more frequent with suvorexant were fatigue, dry mouth, dyspepsia and peripheral oedema. Although there was no overall effect on mood, four patients taking suvorexant developed suicidal ideation. Uncommon adverse effects, such as sleep walking, sleep paralysis and hallucinations, were also only reported in the suvorexant group. 3

For a hypnotic, suvorexant has a long half-life. Although most patients are not affected, some will have residual effects the next day. They should therefore not drive or operate machinery if they are not fully alert. Alcohol and other drugs that depress the central nervous system should be avoided. The safety of suvorexant in pregnancy and lactation is unknown. Patients with neurological or psychiatric disorders were excluded from the trials. 2.3 Suvorexant is contraindicated in narcolepsy.

It should be noted that some of the clinical trials used doses that were higher than the doses approved for use in Australia (15 mg and 20 mg). The higher doses had more adverse effects, but the efficacy of suvorexant at lower doses seems modest. In a systematic review, the differences for suvorexant 15 or 20 mg compared with placebo, after three months of treatment, were six minutes for the time to fall asleep and 16 minutes for total sleep time. Thirteen patients need to be treated for one to have a 15% subjective improvement in total sleep time. As 26 would need to be treated for a 15% improvement in the time to sleep onset, this effect is not significant. The systematic review says that for every 28 people taking suvorexant 15 or 20 mg, one would experience somnolence as an adverse event. four

While suvorexant may be better than placebo, how it compares with other hypnotics is uncertain. Dependence is less likely to be a problem compared to benzodiazepines, but caution is advised when prescribing suvorexant to people with a history of drug abuse. If a hypnotic is required, suvorexant should not be taken for more than three months without the indication being reviewed.

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| Alexey Valerievich Isaev
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| Antisuvorov. Big lie little man
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Warfare is simple and quite accessible to the sound Belsomra of man. But it's hard to fight.
C. Clausewitz

"Excuse me. If you are not ready to forgive, do not read further these lines, curse me and my book - without reading. So do many. I swung at the most sacred that our people have, I swung at the only shrine that the people have left, - in memory of the War, of the so-called "Great Patriotic War". I quote this concept and write with a lowercase letter. Excuse me.
I have an empty soul, and my brain is full of division numbers. For a long time I could not carry such a book for example my brain. It was NECESSARY to write her. But for this it was necessary to flee the country. To do this, you had to become a traitor. "
These words of Vladimir Bogdanovich are taken from the introduction to the Icebreaker. [Suvorov VB Icebreaker. Who started the Second World War? M .: New time. 1992. (Hereinafter referred to as “Icebreaker”.)] V. Suvorov rips off his clothes, sprinkles ashes on his head, in some ecstasy calls himself a traitor, a scoundrel and generally a bad person who did not even spare his own dad. Like, I didn’t want to, but I had to. It was necessary to reveal the truth to the world, to tear off the covers and present to the slightly dumbfounded world public the true culprits of the outbreak of World War II. Even a traitor for this had to become.
I must say, my goal is not to evaluate the actions of the English publicist Vladimir Bogdanovich Rezun, who writes under the pseudonym Victor Suvorov. This, after all, is none of my business. In this book, I will simply analyze the works of Vladimir Bogdanovich, their evidence base and the level of his books as a whole. Was it worth them to do all those acts about which he so heartbreakingly wrote in the preface to the Icebreaker. Let's start with the main thing, with research methods, of the technology that Vladimir Bogdanovich uses to build evidence. V. Suvorov from the very first pages of his narrative claims that he relies on open Soviet sources that anyone who wishes can discover and verify the validity of the “finds” of the innovative journalist. But how many of the readers of “Icebreaker” and “Day Belsomra rushed to the library to compare the quoted quotes with the original sources? I am afraid that there are only a few of them. Most believed in honesty of citation and a another understanding of the context of quotation.
At one time, a friend of mine came to me to see the latest in my library. Word for word, the conversation turned to V. Suvorov and his epoch-making works. Actually, this was a continuation of a long-standing dispute, therefore, in order not to crush the water in the mortar, I went to the shelf on which were the works of Vladimir Bogdanovich, and invited my friend to choose at random any page of any of the books in.

Suvorov, claiming that I would find on her a distortion of the facts of the quoted memoirs or books. He looked doubtfully through this drug 1992 Icebreaker and selected page 202. It did not take a long time to search - some, to put it mildly, distortions, met immediately, in the first paragraph. Vladimir Bogdanovich writes:
“Colonel S.F. Khvaley (at that time deputy commander of the 202nd motorized division of the 12th mechanized corps of the 8th army):“ On the night of June 18, 1941, our division went on field exercises “(Khvalei S.F. On the North-Western Front (1941-1943): Collection of articles.M .: Nauka, 1969. S. 310).
Here the colonel says:
“It so happened that the division’s divisions by the beginning of the war were directly behind the border outposts, that is, in the immediate vicinity of the state border”.
Everything seems to be clear - the division was put forward directly to the border. Apparently, in the process of preparing for the attack on Germany. The reader receives another proof of the theory of Vladimir Bogdanovich. The reader takes Vladimir Bogdanovich’s word for word. The reader will not look for these memoirs and check the quote. But it Belsomra be worth it. The fact is that on the 310th page of the indicated book the following is written: “It so happened that the artillery regiment’s divisions that day, during field exercises, changing their firing positions, found themselves in combat formations of motorized infantry. And when the Nazi troops crushed the border outposts and units of the 125th Infantry Division and advanced in a wide avalanche towards our division, the gunners shot motorcyclists point blank and burned tanks. ” And that’s all. The 202nd division did not stand behind the border guards. The Germans crushed frontier posts, parts of the 125th Infantry Division, and only then collided with the 202nd Division. Moreover, the colonel clearly indicates the boundary of the division: Kelme - Krazhai. Reader, do not be too lazy to take a map and see how close it is to the border. Should I keep in mind the numbers of divisions, if you can’t even correctly quote the source? Or maybe this is not a mistake? Maybe this is a deliberate distortion of information? After all, most readers will not check the author. Most readers simply do not have the opportunity. And the reader takes Vladimir Bogdanovich’s word for word. But in vain.
The game of pages did not end there. Page 232 was chosen as the next. And again we are faced with a distortion of facts:
“So, under the cover of the TASS Report, military commanders of the highest ranks at the head of the armies, and one even at the head of the front’s headquarters, secretly transfer to the German borders, leaving ALL internal military districts to the mercy of fate (and the NKVD)”.
Although, as of June 22, 1941, the rifle corps of the Military District Military District, the Siberian Military District, and the ArkhVO divisions did not move. A significant part of the divisions of the Ural Military District and the Volga Military District has not yet been loaded into the wagons. As an example, Vladimir Bogdanovich cites:
“The 19th Army is all the troops and headquarters of the North Caucasus Military District. The commander of the district, Lieutenant General I. S. Konev, united all the troops of his district into the 19th army, stood at the head of this army and secretly moved west, leaving the district without any military control. ”.
Konev himself writes about it this way: “Remaining the commander of the North Caucasus Military District, I took command of the 19th Army” (I. Konev. Notes of the front commander. M .: Golos, 2000. P. 36). At the time of the outbreak of the war, on June 22, Ivan Stepanovich was in Rostov-on-Don, at the district headquarters. (Ibid., Pp. 38–39.) And again, the reader will not check Vladimir Bogdanovich.
In newspaper articles, the number of, let's say, distortions of reality per unit of printed text in V. Suvorov increases. For example, an interview with Vladimir Bogdanovich with the correspondent of the newspaper Moskovsky Komsomolets, M. Deich, on April 29, 2000. I quote:
“How many armies did we have by June 1941?” There are no numbers. How many mechanized cases were there? It is written: "several." How many airborne corps? Unclear. There is not even accurate information about how many military districts were and who commanded them. ”.
All these figures as of June 1, 1941 are given in the third volume of the 12-volume “History of the Second World War” edition of the 70s, indicated in the bibliography of “Icebreaker”. And information about the commanders of the military districts can be obtained from the "Soviet Military Encyclopedia", which, oddly enough, is also included in the bibliography of books by V. Suvorov. Apparently, the numbers of divisions and armies overflowing the brain of Vladimir Bogdanovich mixed into a uniform indigestible mess. If you do not read books even from the bibliography of your own works, then, of course, you have to say:
"I was looking for. It was a tiring, boring search. ”.
I immediately recall the fable about the Monkey and the glasses. Further our Ostap suffered:
“Stalin is preparing for the offensive. 63 tank divisions - and not a single combat engineer battalion! ”
Here Vladimir Bogdanovich, to put it mildly, gave a blunder. Engineering units, of course, were present in the Red Army on June 22, 1941. If V. Suvorov is interested in engineer battalions, then there were 20 separate and one in each remember that division. For example, in the rifle division in which the father of our hero served, Bogdan Vasilievich Rezun, the 140th rifle division of the 36th rifle corps of the 5th Army of the South-Western Front was the 199th combat engineer battalion. (See "List No. 5 of the infantry, mountain infantry, motorized infantry and motorized divisions that were part of the army during the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945").
A legitimate question arises: why did such a person who, to put it mildly, unscrupulous and poorly versed in the questions under study, become popular? The popularity of V. Suvorov is the popularity of unpretentious Hollywood melodramas and action films. He does not try to lead the reader, to explain complex things in plain language. Vladimir Bogdanovich falls to the level of simple explanations of complex phenomena. Sometimes V. Suvorov imitates a fairy tale, on the pages open his books we will meet “sword-kladenets” at a new technical level, miracle tanks and miracle planes. We will meet Koscheeva's death, in the role of the Ploiesti oil fields. Finally, we will meet the ring of omnipotence, which is a thousand bombers with a fifth engine. Instead of real characters and events of our and world history, Vladimir Bogdanovich invented the heroes of a strange mixture of a folk tale, a bestseller from the station tray and Star Wars Episode N.
Scientific and even journalistic works in this technique are not written. The traditional research methodology involves the consideration of all available data. Facts that contradict the theory must be intelligently explained and interpreted. Claims to Vladimir Bogdanovich, this is not an indication of the minor flaws of a great historian, but a criticism of the methodology for constructing evidence, based on demagogy and distortion of facts. The normally reasoned, albeit unpleasant, official historiography theories are perceived in the scientific community much more calmly. The problem is that, by popularity, scientific papers lose to creations of bestselling paperback masters precisely because of their scientific nature and seriousness. And it’s impossible otherwise. Historical science, despite the absence of specific symbols, such as the mathematical “sign of the integral” or “sign of the sum”, is no less complicated science, requiring a thoughtful and serious approach and certain professional skills. I was convinced of this from my own experience, having spent several years studying the laws of operational art, methods of historical research, documents and books about that war. The book brought to the attention of readers is not only a polemic with V. Suvorov, it is an attempt to write a kind of encyclopedia of war, to give basic knowledge about the principles of warfare and the use of weapons and military equipment.